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Dual pathways to prospective
remembering
Mark A. McDaniel1*, Sharda Umanath1, Gilles O. Einstein2 and Emily R. Waldum1
1 Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA, 2 Furman University, Greenville, SC, USA
According to the multiprocess framework (McDaniel and Einstein, 2000), the cognitive
system can support prospective memory (PM) retrieval through two general pathways.
One pathway depends on top–down attentional control processes that maintain
activation of the intention and/or monitor the environment for the triggering or target
cues that indicate that the intention should be executed. A second pathway depends
on (bottom–up) spontaneous retrieval processes, processes that are often triggered by
a PM target cue; critically, spontaneous retrieval is assumed not to require monitoring
or active maintenance of the intention. Given demand characteristics associated with
experimental settings, however, participants are often inclined to monitor, thereby
potentially masking discovery of bottom–up spontaneous retrieval processes. In this
article, we discuss parameters of laboratory PM paradigms to discourage monitoring
and review recent behavioral evidence from such paradigms that implicate spontaneous
retrieval in PM. We then re-examine the neuro-imaging evidence from the lens of the
multiprocess framework and suggest some critical modifications to existing neuro-
cognitive interpretations of the neuro-imaging results. These modifications illuminate
possible directions and refinements for further neuro-imaging investigations of PM.
Keywords: prospective memory, spontaneous retrieval, neuroimaging of prospective memory, prospective
memory paradigms, monitoring in prospective memory
Dual Pathways to Prospective Remembering
In the mid-1980s, Harris (1984) wrote an important review of prospective memory (PM) in
which he called for further research on this “forgotten topic.” Researchers responded to his plea,
and the past three decades have produced substantial theoretical and empirical development in
understanding the cognitive and neurological processes involved in PM. Much of this research has
examined the retrieval processes that support event-based PM, and we focus on this topic in this
paper. In doing so, we highlight evidence for the existence of two fundamentally diﬀerent types
of retrieval processes, propose a neurocognitive model of PM processes, evaluate existing research
in light of this model, and develop methodological considerations that should enable us to better
isolate these retrieval processes.
A characteristic feature of PM tasks is that they do not include an explicit prompt to engage in
a memory search at the time of retrieval (Craik, 1986). The high self-initiated retrieval demands of
PM tasks contrast with those of explicit retrospective memory tasks like cued recall, in which the
experimenter explicitly directs participants to retrieve (i.e., puts you in a retrieval mode). Thus, in
an event-based PM task, such as remembering to give a friend message, there is typically no one
there to put you in a retrieval mode (and to ask you to search memory for the associated action)
upon encountering the friend. Instead, somehow, in the context of processing your friend as a
friend (e.g., asking her how she is feeling), you have to remember to pass along the message.
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PM Retrieval Processes and Behavioral
Evidence
Many researchers have proposed that this kind of retrieval
can be accomplished by top–down attentional control processes
that maintain activation of the intention and/or search the
environment for the triggering or target cues (McDaniel and
Einstein, 2000; Burgess et al., 2001; Marsh et al., 2003; Smith,
2003). These attentional control processes are generally thought
to be accomplished by the frontoparietal network (Burgess et al.,
2003; Cona et al., 2015) and may be conscious or unconscious
(Smith et al., 2007). Moreover, they are assumed to draw on
limited capacity resources, and thus when these processes are
engaged, there should be detectable costs to the ongoing task.
Behavioral research has produced convincing evidence for the
existence of monitoring processes and for their functional role
in supporting PM. In particular, research shows that adding a
PM intention often slows participants down on an ongoing task
(relative to a control condition performing only the ongoing
task). Smith (2003), for example, gave her participants six PM
targets to learn and asked them to press a designated key
whenever they later encountered any of the six targets in the
context of performing a lexical decision ongoing task. Having a
PM intention produced substantial slowing on the ongoing task
and further, those who slowed down the most had higher PM.
Researchers have typically assumed that this slowing on ongoing
tasks reﬂects capacity consuming costs associated with top–
down monitoring processes (although see Heathcote et al., 2015,
for a diﬀerent interpretation of the costs). Also, emphasizing
the importance of the PM task (relative to the ongoing task)
enhances monitoring levels or costs and also increases PM
with certain types of tasks (i.e., non-focal tasks; Einstein et al.,
2005).
There is now also convincing support for the existence of
bottom–up spontaneous retrieval processes. By spontaneous
retrieval, we mean that the occurrence of a cue can trigger
retrieval of an intention in the absence of monitoring. For
example, we (McDaniel et al., 2004; McDaniel and Einstein, 2007,
2011) have proposed a reﬂexive associative memory process that
supports spontaneous retrieval. According to this view, when
forming an intention (e.g., to press a designated key when
seeing the word rake), we create an association between the
target (rake) and action (press the “/” key) and store that in
long-term memory. Later, in the absence of monitoring for the
PM target, full processing of the target is likely to stimulate
reﬂexive retrieval of the associated action and deliver it to
conscious awareness. This type of retrieval might be experienced
as the intention “popping” into mind, and we assume that this
reﬂexive associative retrieval process is mediated primarily by the
hippocampus and medial temporal lobes (Moscovitch, 1994).
According to the multiprocess framework, a key factor that
determines whether cues are likely to trigger spontaneous
retrieval of the associated intention is the extent to which the
ongoing task directs relevant processing of the PM target cue
(i.e., encourages focal processing). McDaniel and Einstein (2000;
see Maylor, 1996 for a similar proposal) distinguished between
focal processing, in which the ongoing task (i.e., at retrieval)
encourages processing of the target and especially those features
that were processed at encoding, and non-focal processing,
in which the ongoing task does not encourage processing of
those features that were processed at encoding. For example,
when the ongoing task is a lexical decision task (a task that
requires participants to determine whether a letter string forms
a meaningful word), a PM target of a speciﬁc word (e.g., rake) is
focal because the ongoing task directs processing of the semantic
information that was likely processed at encoding. However,
when the ongoing task is a lexical decision task, a PM target of a
word beginning with the letter r is non-focal because the ongoing
task does not direct processing of ﬁrst letters (Scullin et al., 2010b;
see Einstein andMcDaniel, 2005, for additional examples of focal
and non-focal processing). Following the encoding speciﬁcity
principle (Tulving, 1983), the multiprocess framework assumes
that spontaneous retrieval is likely (assuming the formation of
a good association between the target cue and the action) when
there is strong overlap between how a cue was processed at
encoding and at retrieval (i.e., focal processing).
A major diﬃculty in testing the role of spontaneous retrieval
in PM is isolating that process as the functional retrieval process.
Given the demand characteristics associated with experimental
settings as well as the relatively short delays (often a few minutes)
between presentation of the PM instructions and the occurrence
of the PM target (at least relative to many real-world delays), it
seems that participants are often inclined to monitor, even with
focal cues (e.g., Smith et al., 2007). Thus, if one uses conditions
that induce monitoring, one could get the impression that
monitoring and sustained frontoparietal activation are always
necessary to accomplish PM retrieval. And this monitoring,
induced by the task demands, could mask discovery of bottom–
up spontaneous retrieval processes.
In order to test for and isolate spontaneous retrieval processes,
one has to use task conditions that strongly discourage (and
hopefully, eliminate) monitoring. One such study was conducted
by Scullin et al. (2010b, Experiment 4). To test the multiprocess
framework prediction that spontaneous retrieval processes can
accomplish PM retrieval when the target is focal, but that
monitoring processes are needed with a non-focal target, they
presented participants with either a focal or non-focal PM target
only once at the end of a block of over 500 lexical decision trials.
Previous research had shown that monitoring declines over trials
(Harrison and Einstein, 2010) and especially so when no targets
are presented (Loft et al., 2008). By emphasizing the importance
of the ongoing task and presenting the target after so many
trials, Scullin et al. (2010b) were able to observe PM performance
under conditions of no monitoring in the focal condition and
little monitoring in the non-focal condition. The interesting
question was whether participants’ limited abilities to sustain
monitoring by the time of the occurrence of the PM targets
aﬀected focal and non-focal performance diﬀerently. Scullin et al.
(2010b) found high PM performance with a focal target and very
low performance with a non-focal target (the latter of which
depended on whether individuals were monitoring proximal to
the non-focal target). The result of high focal PM performance in
the absence of monitoring suggested that spontaneous retrieval
processes can support focal prospective remembering. On the
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other hand, very low PM performance in the non-focal condition
indicated that PM retrieval with a non-focal cue is highly
dependent on monitoring.
Another approach for isolating spontaneous retrieval is to
present participants with a focal PM target during a phase
in which the PM intention has been suspended (and thus
participants are unlikely to be monitoring). For example, Scullin
et al. (2009) gave participants the PM intention to press the Q
key when they saw a particular PM cue (e.g., the word writer)
during an image-rating task. After encoding this intention, the
experimenters suspended the intention by telling participants
that the image-rating task would occur during a later phase of
the experiment and that they would not need to perform the
PM task until that phase. Participants then performed a lexical
decision task, during which, the PM cue writer was unexpectedly
presented several times. The critical ﬁnding was that participants
responded more slowly to writer than to matched-control items
that occurred during the lexical decision task (i.e., the suspended
phase). Importantly, because participants were told that they
did not need to perform the PM task during the suspended
phase, they were not devoting resources to monitoring for the
PM cue. Thus, the slowed processing of that cue when it was
presented during the lexical decision task reﬂected spontaneous
noticing or retrieval of some aspects of the PM intention. This
slowing to target items during a suspended phase has been found
consistently (Cohen et al., 2005; Einstein et al., 2005; Marsh et al.,
2006; Knight et al., 2011; Rummel et al., 2012). There is also
evidence that participants spontaneously react (slow down or
even produce commission errors) when processing a PM target
event after they have been told that the PM task is completed
(Scullin et al., 2012; Walser et al., 2012; Bugg and Scullin, 2013;
Beck et al., 2014).
An important question in evaluating the value of a suspended
intention paradigm for examining spontaneous retrieval is
determining how much of the PM intention is retrieved in
this type of paradigm. The observed slowing could reﬂect
partial retrieval of the intention (perhaps general noticing or a
general sense of familiarity) or full conscious retrieval of the
intention. To examine this, we (Einstein et al., 2014) recently
borrowed a research method from the involuntary memory
literature (Kvavilashvili and Schlagman, 2011) and occasionally
probed participants to tell us what they were thinking about
at various points during the suspended phase. Speciﬁcally,
when probed, they were asked to describe their thoughts,
if any, at the moment they were stopped. Participants were
always probed after neutral words, but sometimes these neutral
words immediately followed a PM target cue and sometimes
the neutral words were not proximal to a PM target cue.
Interestingly, prior to the occurrence of the ﬁrst target event,
0% (of 82 participants) reported thinking about the PM task
(indicating that the suspended instructions were successful in
eliminating monitoring). By contrast, when stopped after a
neutral cue following the ﬁrst prospective target cue, ∼40% of
the participants reported thinking about the PM task. Thus,
it appears that PM target cues that occur in a suspended
phase (when participants are not monitoring) often produce full
retrieval of the PM intention.
Usefulness of Exploring Multiple
Processes
Consideration of the view that PM retrieval can be accomplished
with multiple processes (McDaniel and Einstein, 2000) has
the potential to reﬁne our understanding of existing results
and to give theoretical impetus for developing new insights.
For example, although the general consensus is that normal
aging disrupts PM, close examination of the research shows
remarkable variability, with some studies showing large eﬀects
of age and others showing no or only small age eﬀects (e.g.,
Kliegel et al., 2008). One interpretation of these results is that
aging disrupts capacity consuming monitoring processes but
tends to preserve relatively automatic retrieval processes (e.g.,
Craik, 1986; Cohn et al., 2008; for a diﬀerent view, see Uttl, 2011).
Consistent with this interpretation, Mullet et al. (2013) found
no age diﬀerences on a focal task when participants relied on
spontaneous retrieval processes but age diﬀerences on a non-focal
task that required monitoring processes. As another example of
the potential usefulness of distinguishing between monitoring
and spontaneous retrieval processes, there have been interesting
attempts to examine whether sleep in general, and slow wave
sleep in particular, diﬀerentially aﬀects spontaneous retrieval and
monitoring (Diekelmann et al., 2013).
Ourmain focus in the current article is to apply this distinction
to the emergent PM and neuroimaging literature. Speciﬁcally, in
the following sections, we use the multiprocess framework (and
related behavioral support for the framework) as a lens through
which to consider the neurocognitive underpinnings of PM and
reﬁne the interpretation of the rapidly growing neuroimaging
results that are being reported.
Implications for the Neuroscience of PM
Recently, Cona et al. (2015) provided a thoughtful and ambitious
integration of the neuroimaging ﬁndings related to PM. To
organize these ﬁndings, they proposed a new neurocognitive
model of PM, the Attention to Delayed Intention (AtoDI)
Model. This model captures PM and associated neuroimaging
ﬁndings as a sequential multi-phase process that begins with
encoding of the intention, followed by maintenance of the
intention, and concluding with intention retrieval. From the
perspective of the multiprocess framework, we suggest that this
overarching scheme overly simpliﬁes the complexity of PM, and
as a consequence, may draw generalities that mask important
neurocognitive diﬀerences (and thus neuroimaging patterns)
across various PM tasks. Speciﬁcally, our view diverges from two
main characterizations that are embedded in the AtoDI model.
First, the AtoDI model characterizes PM as involving a
maintenance stage in which strategic monitoring is prominent,
and thereby requires signiﬁcant involvement of a frontal–
attentional network. Based on the multiprocess framework and
the behavioral evidence discussed in the previous sections, we
think it is more accurate to assume that an active maintenance
stage can be present in PM (e.g., in non-focal PM tasks); however,
active maintenance (and thus sustained frontal–attentional
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processes) is not required for PM and indeed is minimally
involved, if at all, in some PM tasks (e.g., focal tasks; Einstein
et al., 2005; Scullin et al., 2010a,b; see also, Gilbert et al., 2013).
In the next section, we revisit the fMRI ﬁndings regarding
sustained neural activity from the perspective of the multiprocess
framework.
Second, the AtoDI model characterizes the retrieval stage as a
spontaneous, bottom–up process (see Figure 4, Cona et al., 2015).
The multiprocess framework assumes that spontaneous retrieval
processes are prominent mainly when active maintenance is
not present (e.g., focal cues). For PM tasks in which active
maintenance is sustained, we suggest that retrieval processes
are not relatively spontaneous. Instead, retrieval would likely
occur in a more top–down fashion. These top–down retrieval
processes might serve as a check to match the encountered
cue and maintained intention with the originally encoded
intention and cue (see Smith, 2003). Consequently, these PM
tasks could have somewhat diﬀerent, but overlapping, neural
signatures than would those supported by spontaneous retrieval
processes. In terms of neuroimaging results, we would expect
such diﬀerences across PM tasks to appear in the transient
neural activity associated with presentation of the PM cue. We
develop this distinction (not evident in the AtoDI model) in
a subsequent section that focuses on transient fMRI activation.
(It should be noted that Cona et al., 2015, brieﬂy suggest
that PM tasks that diﬀerentially recruit strategic monitoring
and spontaneous retrieval processes would likely diﬀerentially
activate relevant networks, but they do not explore this in their
meta-analysis.)
With the above distinctions in mind, we focused on
studies included in the Cona et al. (2015) meta-analysis that
involved event-based PM tasks. To foreshadow, the existing
neuroimaging literature bears out some of our distinctions and
provides preliminary support for a modiﬁed “dual pathways”
neurocognitive model of PM based on the mulitprocess
framework (see Figure 1). The dual pathways neurocognitive
model is more consistent with the multiprocess framework (see
Figure 1) and draws attention to lingering issues regarding PM
and its neural correlates. Gilbert et al. (2013)’s computational
model of PM also provides support for our modiﬁed model. We
emphasize at the outset that a critical limitation in the literature
is that to this point, only one study has investigated the neural
diﬀerences and similarities between focal and non-focal PM tasks
and distinctly examined sustained versus transient neural activity:
McDaniel et al. (2013). All others included only one task type
or the other, with few separating sustained activity during the
ongoing task and transient activity tied to the PM trials (see
Table 1). Note that our aim is simply to draw attention to
important issues in PM that can be eﬀectively addressed through
the continued examination of brain areas that are highlighted
in our adjusted neurocognitive model of PM; at this stage,
neuroimaging studies are not available to decisively inform our
hypotheses.
Sustained Activity: Maintenance of an Intention
First, consider the sustained activity during the ongoing task,
which has been assumed to reﬂect active maintenance of the
intention and likely strategic monitoring for the PM target
FIGURE 1 | The Dual Pathways Model of prospective memory (based on the multiprocess framework) depicted graphically. The solid black arrows
indicate the sequence of processing across stages. The dashed-line light arrows indicate that (1) even in a focal task, one can recruit strategic monitoring processes
and (2) non-focal tasks may need not always involve retrieval from long-term memory.
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TABLE 1 | Neuroimaging paradigms used to investigate prospective memory and their characteristics in terms of ongoing task, focal and non-focal PM
cues and examining overall, sustained, or transient activations.
Paper Ongoing task PM task (S/D) PM task
type
% Trials on
which PM
targets appear
Neural activation examined
Overall
Only
Sustained Transient
Okuda et al. (1998) Repeat sets of 5 words aloud Tap for words encoded prior to
scanning (S)
Focal 5% X
Okuda et al. (2007) Serial addition of digits Squeeze hands when seven
appeared (S)
Focal 12.5% X
Kalpouzos et al.
(2010)
Virtual reality navigation of five
routes
Perform list of errands (D) Focal N/A; 22 total X X
Benoit et al. (2011) Two similar tasks: (1) navigate
edges of shapes, at corners,
decide a L or R turn; (2) classify
capital letters for straight or curved
lines
Respond when at certain corners
of shapes; respond for certain
letters (S)
Focal 11% X
Gilbert (2011) Two-back task with words or
pictures
When pic or word had colored
border, encode as PM cue and
key-press when see it later (S)
Focal 3% X X
Gilbert et al. (2012) Same as Gilbert (2011) Same as Gilbert (2011) Focal Same as Gilbert
(2011)
X X
McDaniel et al.
(2013)
Semantic classification task, 525
trials
F: respond to a certain word; NF:
respond to a certain syllable (S)
Focal,
Non-
focal
4% X X
Burgess et al.
(2001)
Four similar tasks, e.g., press key
in direction of larger of two
numbers
Respond if both even numbers
(S)
Non-
focal
20% X
Burgess et al.
(2003)
Three tasks from Burgess et al.
(2001)
Same as Burgess et al. (2001) Non-
focal
Same as Burgess
et al. (2001)
X
den Ouden et al.
(2005)
Answer questions pertaining to
intentions and consequences,
e.g., “you are at the cinema and
have trouble seeing the screen. Do
you move to another seat? Likely
or unlikely?”
Respond if background is red, of
five total colors (S)
Non-
focal
23% X
Simons et al. (2006) Two tasks:
(1) Indicate the longer of a pair of a
lowercase and uppercase word
(2) Indicate direction of a shape
relative to a triangle in a grid
Cue ID: (1) Respond to
semantically associated pairs
(2) Respond if shapes were a
chess knight’s move away from
one another (S); Intention
retrieval: (1) When words are both
lowercase, decide if syllables of
two words are greater or less
than four; (2) When shapes are
the same color, decide if sides of
the non-triangle are greater or
less than five (S)
Non-
focal
NA; 32 total X
Gilbert et al. (2009) Two similar tasks: (1) Indicate
direction of capital of two letters;
(2) indicate direction of two dots
(versus 1)
(1) Respond if same letter
(2) Respond if dots form a line (S)
Non-
focal
12.5% X X
Reynolds et al.
(2009)
One-back task, respond if same or
different from previous trial
Special key-press for target color
of stimuli (S)
Non-
focal
11% X X
Hashimoto et al.
(2011)
Two-back task, respond if same or
different from two back
Food category words (S) Non-
focal
6% X
Rea et al. (2011) Decide same/diff gender of face
pairs
Respond to specific face pair (S) Non-
focal
3% X
Rusted et al. (2011) Sort playing cards by suit Respond to seven card (S) Non-
focal
8% X
Beck et al. (2014) Move joystick in the direction of a
colored arrow presented on the
screen in relation to a fixation cross
Key-press instead if arrow is red
(S)
Non-
focal
17% X X
The studies are ordered by the type of PM cue and publication year. In the PM task, D refers to having different PM intention throughout the PM task [e.g., Kalpouzos
et al. (2010), participants had a list of various errands to complete]; S refers to having the same PM intention throughout [e.g., Hashimoto et al. (2011), participants were
asked to respond to every food category word].
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cue. Sustained activity related to PM processes is assessed by
contrasting blocks of trials that include the PM task with control
blocks that require only the ongoing task (see Table 1 for a
description of the ongoing task and PM task in each study).
With PM tasks that use non-focal cues (e.g., press a key when
two numbers presented on the screen are both even when the
ongoing task is to indicate which has the greater value, Burgess
et al., 2001; indicate when a particular face pair is presented when
the ongoing task is to identify whether the faces are of the same
gender, Rea et al., 2011), we expect sustained activity, reﬂecting
Cona et al. (2015)’s proposal that the dorsal frontoparietal
network is involved in strategic monitoring processes during
the maintenance phase (i.e., during the ongoing task subsequent
to PM encoding and prior to detection of a PM cue; see also,
Reynolds et al., 2009). McDaniel et al. (2013), for instance,
reported sustained activity during the ongoing processing task
(a category decision task) for a non-focal PM task (execute the
intention when a particular syllable, “tor,” appeared) in bilateral
DLPFC (BA46), anterior cingulate, bilateral parietal lobule (BA7),
bilateral precentral gyrus, and FEF (BA6). Reynolds et al. (2009)
also found sustained activity for a non-focal PM task in BA 10,
BA 46, and anterior cingulate cortex, as well as in bilateral inferior
parietal lobe (BA 40) and the cerebellum. Additionally, Beck et al.
(2014) found sustained activity for a non-focal PM task in the
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex in a predeﬁned ROI analysis.
Gilbert et al. (2009) implemented a self-initiated non-focal PM
condition, in which participants were asked to indicate the side
of the screen on which a capital letter appeared when presented
with one letter on each side of a central ﬁxation cross and told
that they would score points for responding to particular non-
focal target events (when the letters were the same, regardless of
capitalization); unlike the “cued” PM condition in their study,
these participants were not given further explicit instruction to
complete this additional (PM) task. Presumably this condition
stimulated relatively high levels of self-initiated behavior and
strategic monitoring. Gilbert et al. (2009) found sustained activity
in left VLPFC, left insula, bilateral supplementary motor areas,
bilateral posterior cingulate, precuneus, left inferior and superior
parietal cortex, right lateral temporal cortex, and left medial
temporal lobe. These are likely the areas that reﬂect maintenance
of an intention and indicate the strategic monitoring for PM cues
engaged during an attention-demanding ongoing task. Generally,
researchers have taken the sustained activity in the rostral-lateral
area (e.g., see Burgess et al., 2003; Simons et al., 2006) and
frontoparietal network (Cona et al., 2015) as requisite signatures
of PM. By contrast, our claim is that not all PM tasks involve (or
require) sustained activation of a rostral–lateral area or a dorsal
frontoparietal network to actively maintain the PM intention and
monitor for appropriate cues—that is, no active maintenance is
necessary.
Speciﬁcally, we take the strong stance that for focal PM
tasks that do not stimulate monitoring (see the ﬁnal section for
guidelines on implementing such tasks), an active maintenance
stage is not involved, and accordingly, there will be little or no
sustained neural activity associated with PM across the ongoing
task. Supporting this prediction, McDaniel et al. (2013) found
no areas showing any sustained activation (relative to control
blocks without the PM task) for a focal PM task (execute the
intention on presentation of a particular word during an ongoing
categorization task). In a subsequent study, Beck et al. (2014)
examined activation during a post-PM block, another technique
to capture possible spontaneous retrieval processes. In their
study, after the PM block (that included a non-focal but salient
PM cue—a red colored item), participants completed another
block of the ongoing task with explicit instructions that they
no longer needed to perform the PM task. For this post-PM
block, they found no activation in the rostrolateral prefrontal
cortex from a predeﬁned ROI analysis, though when PM targets
appeared there was transient activation (discussed in the next
section).
Note that the absence of sustained activation is in stark
contrast to the corpus of ﬁndings with non-focal PM cues. We
again emphasize, however, that important contextual features in
the PM paradigm can encourage participants to actively monitor
for the PM cue even when the cue is focal. For instance, when
the paradigm includes many PM target cues, strategic monitoring
will likely be encouraged, regardless of whether these cues are
focal (see Smith, 2003). For this reason, it is important to note
that it is possible that focal PM tasks may show sustained activity.
Indeed, three studies using focal PM cues (Kalpouzos et al.,
2010; Gilbert, 2011; Gilbert et al., 2012) have isolated sustained
activity in the ongoing task from transient activity on PM trials.
These areas of sustained activity included the bilateral lateral PFC
(BA 10/46), medial rPFC, bilateral insula, and anterior cingulate
(Gilbert, 2011), the top–down attentional network through the
dorsal system (FEF and superior parietal; Kalpouzos et al.,
2010), and parietal areas (Gilbert, 2011; Gilbert et al., 2012).
What’s more, activation in these areas is generally greatest for
subsequently successful PM. These areas are quite similar to
those showing sustained activation for non-focal tasks (discussed
above), including the insula, anterior cingulate, and parietal areas
(Kalpouzos et al., 2010; Gilbert, 2011), suggesting that processing
for these focal PM tasks involved strategic monitoring.
In light of critical features of the above paradigms, it seems
likely that even with focal PM cues, participants were engaging
strategic monitoring. For example, in Kalpouzos et al. (2010),
participants were navigating a virtual reality environment of
their hometown and had a total of 22 various focal PM tasks
to perform. The ongoing task was rather minimal in that
participants only needed to take a certain route as they performed
the PM tasks. With such a high frequency of diﬀerent targets,
participants were likely steered toward monitoring for those
targets (see the ﬁnal section in this article), and an ongoing
task that probably did not require their full attention would
not discourage such strategic monitoring. In line with this
supposition, the authors state that “most of the PM intentions
were self-initiated, resulting in an active intention maintenance
phase before target detection” (p. 7). The authors go on to
state that nevertheless, “a few intentions were triggered by the
perception of the targets” (p. 7).
Similarly, in Gilbert (2011), the overall procedure was
speciﬁcally created such that “correct responses on PM retrieve
trials had to be self-initiated on the occurrence of the
appropriate item, rather than being strongly cued by the stimulus
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characteristics” (p. 2889), and the behavioral results converged
with this claim by showing a RT cost for PM trial blocks
relative to control blocks. The same procedure was used in
Gilbert et al. (2012). These studies underscore that the extant PM
neuroimaging literature is replete with PM tasks that stimulate
strategic monitoring, even for the few studies that have used focal
PM tasks. Accordingly, there has been little opportunity to reveal
neural activation dynamics for the kinds of PM tasks reviewed at
the outset of this article for which strategic monitoring is absent.
As a consequence, we suggest that the neuroimaging literature
needs to be extended to provide a more complete and accurate
picture of the neural processes associated with a range of PM tasks
that reﬂect everyday prospective remembering.
Transient Activity: Retrieval Processes
A second point of departure from the AtoDI analysis is that the
multiprocess approach anticipates that the dynamics of transient
activation linked to retrieval (i.e., activation that occurs only
during the target trials and not throughout the ongoing task)
for focal and non-focal PM are somewhat diﬀerent. This said,
given that both focal and non-focal PM tasks are event-based and
may both require episodic retrieval (of the encoded intention),
it makes sense to expect that there would be overlap in the
network of areas activated for both tasks (see for instance, Hall
et al., 2014, for the neural basis of voluntary and involuntary
episodic memories). However, because the retrieval process in
focal PM is assumed to be spontaneous, we would expect that the
retrieval processes may not involve strategic retrieval operations
[associated with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC);Dobbins
and Han, 2006; see also Hall et al., 2014], and instead may
originate with bottom–up processes stimulated by hippocampal-
system activation. By contrast, retrieval in non-focal PM, wherein
strategic monitoring and top–down processes are involved, could
involve DLPFC and activations “primed” or stimulated by aPFC
structures (McDaniel et al., 2013). For example, Gilbert and
colleagues [Gilbert (2011), Gilbert et al. (2013)] have proposed
a model that suggests “content free” monitoring in lateral BA 10
that co-activates intention-content brain regions. Alternatively,
it is possible that when the non-focal PM cue appears, there
may not be a need for retrieval per se (from long-term memory)
because the intention has been actively maintained in working
memory throughout. Again, we simply draw attention to some
interesting and suggestive data as very little work has directly
examined this issue.
Comparisons across several studies that diﬀerentiated
sustained and transient activity indicate that somewhat diﬀerent
areas might be involved in retrieval for focal versus non-focal PM.
Transient activity related to PM related processes is determined
by comparing activations during PM cue presentation to
activations for non-target trials during PM blocks (Kalpouzos
et al., 2010, these were trials at the end of the task) or trials
during control blocks (or both, McDaniel et al., 2013). Transient
activation for focal tasks was found in pre/post-central gyrus
(BA3/4) and cerebellum (Gilbert, 2011) especially for successful
PM (Gilbert et al., 2012). Other implicated areas include posterior
cingulate (Gilbert, 2011), VLPFC and left MTL including the
hippocampus (Kalpouzos et al., 2010). Additionally, medial PFC
(BA9/10), caudate, and the occipito-temporal cortex showed
diﬀerential activation between successful and unsuccessful PM
(Gilbert et al., 2012). These ﬁndings are consistent with Cona
et al. (2015)’s hypothesis that the ventral frontoparietal network
may underlie spontaneous retrieval processes. It is important to
be reminded that though Kalpouzos et al. (2010), Gilbert (2011),
and Gilbert et al. (2012) used focal cues, they also included
design features that likely stimulated strategic monitoring for
the cues. Consequently, transient activations from these studies
may occasionally indicate spontaneous retrieval for target trials
on which monitoring may have momentarily lapsed prior to the
target trial, but such transient activations are likely blended with
those on trials for which monitoring was engaged. Thus, future
exploration is critical for more decisive evidence regarding these
areas’ involvement in spontaneous retrieval.
By contrast, transient activation results from studies using
only non-focal tasks showed somewhat diﬀerent patterns. Gilbert
et al. (2009) found that in their self-initiated non-focal task,
insula, right inferior parietal, bilateral lateral rostral PFC, bilateral
ventral temporal cortex, and left lateral occipital cortex showed
increased activation along with the insula and parietal areas
showing increased activation for successful PM. Beck et al.
(2014) found transient activation in several areas including right
DLPFC, medial superior frontal gyrus, right middle inferior
frontal gyrus, bilateral anterior insula, left posterior inferior
frontal gyrus, left posterior medial frontal gyrus, bilateral medial
temporal gyrus, bilateral ventral parietal cortex, precuneus, and
posterior cingulate. Two other studies focused exclusively on
retrieval or the transient activity associated with non-focal PM
trials (Rea et al., 2011; Rusted et al., 2011). BA 40, including
the bilateral marginal gyrus (Rea et al., 2011), inferior parietal
gyrus (Rea et al., 2011), and inferior parietal lobule (Rusted et al.,
2011), was activated in these studies. This pattern is consistent
with retrieval-related BA 40 activation generally in non-focal
tasks (bilateral ventral parietal cortex: McDaniel et al., 2013;
inferior parietal cortex: Gilbert et al., 2009; post-central gyrus:
Beck et al., 2014), as has been emphasized previously (Burgess
et al., 2011). BA 40 has also been active in non-focal tasks
where only overall activity was measured (Burgess et al., 2001,
2003; Simons et al., 2006). Cona et al. (2015) associated this
region with the maintenance phase of PM (see Reynolds et al.,
2009), but it appears to also be involved at retrieval, but only
for non-focal tasks, not for focal tasks (except see McDaniel
et al., 2013). As noted earlier, a possible interpretation is when
the non-focal PM cue appears, there may not be a need for
retrieval per se from long-term memory as the intention has been
actively maintained in working memory all along. On one view of
working memory, this maintenance could be realized as holding
PM-related information in an active state, even if not directly in
the focus of attention (Cowan, 1999). Such information could
require complete activation when the target cue was presented
but not require retrieval from long-term memory.
Additionally, the anterior cingulate was associated with
transient activity during retrieval for non-focal tasks (Rusted
et al., 2011; McDaniel et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2014). Like BA
40, this area has been discussed previously as important to PM
(Burgess et al., 2011), but now, it seems that it is speciﬁcally
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involved in non-focal PM or tasks that use more strategic
monitoring. For example, a more demanding non-focal task
showed activation of the area compared to a less demanding one
(Simons et al., 2006). Cona et al. (2015) proposed that this area
is involved in spontaneous retrieval processes. Instead, given its
involvement in non-focal tasks that hinge on strategic monitoring
(e.g., Hashimoto et al., 2011), we suggest that this area plays a role
when strategic monitoring is engaged and thus conﬂict is created
between the ongoing task goals and responses and the PM goals
and responses. When a PM cue is detected based on strategic
monitoring, conﬂict may arise between continuing to perform the
ongoing task and retrieval of the relevant PM intention followed
by execution of the PM response, thereby giving rise to the
transient activity during the target trial.
In line with this possibility, note that this area also showed
sustained activation in non-focal tasks (Reynolds et al., 2009;
McDaniel et al., 2013). The idea here is that in the presence
of strategic monitoring, on both non-target items (which are
included in sustained activation) and target items, the individual
is always confronted with the specter of both the ongoing
response and the PM response. [Prior work has found activation
in the anterior cingulate gyrus for focal tasks. However, as
mentioned above, based on the designs of the studies and
instructions to participants, it is likely that participants did not
rely on spontaneous retrieval processes and were encouraged
to recruit strategic monitoring (Okuda et al., 1998, 2007). As
such, the authors themselves indicate that activation was likely
associated with the holding of an intention.] In sum, given
the anterior cingulate’s association with conﬂict processing,
it is not surprising that non-focal tasks might recruit it
at both maintenance (non-target trials) and retrieval (target
trials).
The anterior cingulate may not be as activated for focal PM
cues when strategic monitoring is not encouraged (Benoit et al.,
2011; Gilbert et al., 2012, with the caveat noted above in mind;
but see McDaniel et al., 2013, in the next paragraph). According
to our working hypothesis, for focal cues, retrieval is stimulated
by hippocampal systems, and in the presence of hippocampally
mediated retrieval of goal information, the frontal systems are
“grabbed” or dominated by this goal, thereby reducing the
conﬂict evident when a PM cue is detected based on strategic
monitoring. Overall, of note is simply that the areas activated in
the focal tasks may not completely overlap with those that show
transient activity in non-focal tasks. In fact, consistent with our
claim that some non-focal tasks may not even have a retrieval
stage, Reynolds et al. (2009) found no transient activity tied to
PM trials for a non-focal task.
Interestingly, however, McDaniel et al. (2013) did not ﬁnd
diﬀerent areas showing transient activation tied to the PM trials:
equivalent transient activation was present for both focal and
non-focal PM tasks in left anterior cingulate gyrus, bilateral
anterior insula (BA47), bilateral FEF (BA6), right basal ganglia,
thalamus, and bilateral ventral parietal cortex (BA40). However,
they also conducted connectivity analyses on correct PM trials as
a stricter test of dissociable eﬀects. They found that the anterior
PFC was more strongly connected to the precuneus for non-
focal trials and to the right middle temporal gyrus for focal
ones, perhaps indicating diﬀerential retrieval pathways for focal
and non-focal tasks. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that
further work examining the transient activity at retrieval for tasks
that require more or less strategic monitoring (and rely less or
more on spontaneous processes, respectively) may be fruitful.
Beck et al. (2014) provide some initial insight into
spontaneous retrieval processes. In their study, modeled
after Scullin et al. (2011), after a non-focal PM block participants
completed another block of the ongoing task for which they were
instructed that they no longer needed to perform the PM task.
Critically, PM targets still appeared during this block. The logic
is that if participants no longer needed to perform the PM task,
they would be unlikely to strategically monitor for PM targets;
thus, any responses to former PM targets, observed in associated
transient activity, would be indicative of spontaneous retrieval
processes. Bilateral ventral parietal cortex (or angular gyrus), the
precuneus, and posterior cingulate cortex all showed increased
transient activity associated with the PM targets during this post-
PM block. In combination with behavioral results that indicate
spontaneous retrieval (a lack of decrement in ongoing task
performance), these regions may be the ﬁrst clear evidence of the
areas involved in spontaneous retrieval processes. The authors
point out that these areas have been previously implicated in
bottom–up driven attention and in episodic memory retrieval,
consistent with our model. [Though the PM cue was non-focal,
it might be assumed to be salient (red color), thereby stimulating
noticing.]
Other Areas of Interest
As noted above, several relevant studies including either focal or
non-focal tasks did not diﬀerentiate between sustained activity
associated with the ongoing task and transient activity tied to
the PM trials. Even when this was the case, there were overall
diﬀerences in the neural correlates of focal and non-focal PM.
Though these general patterns are less incisive, we note a few of
these diﬀerences as points of investigation for future work.
One prominent area that theoretically would be aligned with
spontaneous retrieval is the hippocampus (Moscovitch, 1994).
Yet neuroimaging results have not clearly revealed transient
hippocampal activation associated with focal PM, perhaps
because without very high resolution technology, these signals are
diﬃcult to detect (see also Cona et al., 2015). However, evidence
that the hippocampus plays a critical role in retrieval for focal
PM has been reported in a structural MRI study that examined
associations between gray matter volume and focal and non-focal
PM performance (Gordon et al., 2011). In older adults, focal
PM but not non-focal PM performance was positively associated
with medial temporal volume, most prominently that of the
hippocampus.
Cona et al. (2015) drew attention to the insula, suggesting that
it is involved in spontaneous retrieval processes and bottom–
up detection of cues in the environment. In contrast, based on
its more common activation in non-focal tasks (Burgess et al.,
2001; Simons et al., 2006; Gilbert et al., 2009; Rea et al., 2011;
Beck et al., 2014) than in focal tasks (Kalpouzos et al., 2010;
Gilbert, 2011), we suggest that this area may be more related
to strategic monitoring processes. In the few focal tasks where
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the insula showed activity, as discussed above participants were
encouraged to use strategic monitoring. In fact, even with a non-
focal task, Simons et al. (2006) found greater insula activation
for a more demanding non-focal task (see also, Gilbert et al.,
2009 for greater sustained activity). Interestingly, the insula has
shown both sustained and transient activation in a non-focal task
(Gilbert et al., 2009; Cona et al., 2015; in contrast, see Burgess
et al., 2001). Prior work has associated the insula with salience
processing (Cona et al., 2015). As such, the insula may serve to
help strategic monitoring for cues and increase the salience of the
cue (Cona et al., 2015), hence its recruitment in non-focal tasks.
Activation of BA 9 (medial lateral pre-frontal) has been
associated with focal PM (Okuda et al., 1998, 2007; Benoit et al.,
2011) somewhat more often than with non-focal PM (Simons
et al., 2006; Hashimoto et al., 2011; Rea et al., 2011). Interestingly,
this area has been previously implicated in involuntary episodic
retrieval (Hall et al., 2008). In addition, as mentioned above, BA
9 showed transient activation for instances of successful retrieval
in a focal PM task (Gilbert et al., 2012). Thus, the involvement of
BA 9may reﬂect spontaneous retrieval processes underlying focal
PM and warrants further investigation.
Finally, no discussion of the neural correlates of PM is
complete without mention of BA 10, referred to variously as
rostral prefrontal cortex, frontal pole, and the frontopolar cortex.
This area has been repeatedly implicated in PM tasks, and its
involvement in PM has been previously discussed (Cona et al.,
2015, for a review; see Burgess et al., 2011). Of interest is that
this area shows involvement in both non-focal and focal PM
(Okuda et al., 1998, 2007; Burgess et al., 2001, 2003; den Ouden
et al., 2005; Reynolds et al., 2009; Kalpouzos et al., 2010; Benoit
et al., 2011; Gilbert, 2011; Hashimoto et al., 2011; Rea et al., 2011;
Rusted et al., 2011); however, the particular activation dynamics
within certain areas of BA 10 diﬀer across non-focal and focal PM
tasks. Speciﬁcally, both types of tasks show deactivation of medial
BA 10 (Burgess et al., 2003; Kalpouzos et al., 2010; Benoit et al.,
2011). Such deactivation is thought to be environmentally driven
and to signal disengagement from external stimuli, which would
be expected to occur in both focal and non-focal PM (Burgess
et al., 2003; Okuda et al., 2007; Benoit et al., 2011).
While medial BA 10 deactivation is commonly observed in
both focal and non-focal PM, the pattern of medial BA 10
deactivation coupled with activation of lateral BA 10 (Cona et al.,
2015) has been observed exclusively in non-focal tasks (Burgess
et al., 2003; den Ouden et al., 2005; Simons et al., 2006; Benoit
et al., 2011; Rusted et al., 2011); for focal tasks, activation of lateral
BA 10 is not commonly observed. Activation of lateral BA 10 has
been discussed as reﬂecting the directing of attention internally
and modulation of internal thoughts (Burgess et al., 2003; Simons
et al., 2006; Okuda et al., 2007) and as having monitoring-speciﬁc
involvement in PM (Gilbert et al., 2013). It is also implicated in
tasks that have a high memory load (Simons et al., 2006; Gilbert
et al., 2009; Barban et al., 2014; Cona et al., 2015). Thus, in PM
tasks, it may be involved in maintenance of an intention during
an ongoing task (Reynolds et al., 2009; Benoit et al., 2011) and the
retrieval that follows (Gilbert et al., 2009). Consistent with such
evidence, the pattern of medial BA 10 deactivation and lateral BA
10 activation is even stronger for a more self-initiated non-focal
task, wherein intention retrieval demands were higher (Simons
et al., 2006; see also, Gilbert et al., 2009). (As noted earlier,
however, Gilbert et al., 2013, have suggested a “content free”
monitoring role for lateral BA 10.) Here too, the consideration
of whether a PM task involves cues that are relatively focal versus
non-focal informs the involvement of BA 10 in PM.
Directions for Future Work
As outlined in the current paper, it is clear that additional
work is necessary to elucidate the neural processes involved
in the diﬀerent types of PM. Some of this work should aim
to determine diﬀerences in sustained activation associated with
maintenance of intentions and transient activity tied to PM
retrieval. Using the distinction between focal and non-focal
PM tasks as a means to more clearly diﬀerentiate the neural
mechanisms of spontaneous retrieval processes from those of
strategic monitoring is necessary. Because this type of work has
been lacking, it remains unclear if somewhat distinct neural
dynamics associated with diﬀerent retrieval processes underlie
types of PM that theoretically draw on varying processes. Moving
beyond investigations of BA 10 and prefrontal involvement in
PM, future work might aim to understand the contributions of
other commonly implicated areas, including BA 40, the anterior
cingulate cortex, BA 9, and the insula. Similarly, as Cona et al.
(2015) point out, further examination of the medial temporal
lobes’ contribution is needed.
Finally, given that so many varied areas can be involved in
diﬀerent types of PM tasks, future work should also aim to
clarify the connectivity of the activated regions (Gilbert, 2011).
How do these areas communicate with one another and when in
the process of carrying out a delayed intention do they become
involved? We posit that analyses illuminating these dynamics
might provide valuable insights concerning the degree to which
spontaneous retrieval processes are initiated by medial/temporal
hippocampal activation, which activates (“grabs”) frontal control
processes to execute the intention, whereas retrieval associated
with strategic monitoring might be initiated in a more top–
down fashion to activate medial temporal/hippocampal areas
to conﬁrm the intention should be executed (i.e., retrieve the
encoded cue—intention association). Here, we hoped simply to
draw attention to the myriad of lingering questions regarding the
neural correlates of PM and oﬀer a neurocognitive model that is
borne out of a strong theoretical basis in behavioral research.
Methodological Considerations
Further progress on these topics and in distinguishing between
spontaneous retrieval and monitoring processes is critically
dependent on creating experimental and neuroimaging
paradigms that clearly isolate spontaneous retrieval and
monitoring processes in PM tasks. As noted earlier, it is very
diﬃcult to eliminate monitoring in laboratory PM paradigms,
and few studies have convincingly done so. From our perspective,
the current state of aﬀairs in PM research is not unlike that found
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in the retrospective memory ﬁeld two decades ago. Memory
researchers were positing the inﬂuences of controlled and
automatic processes in retrospective memory, but could not
move forward until paradigms and techniques were developed
to isolate these processes in memory performance. In a similar
vein, as more researchers become interested in PM, it would be
valuable to clearly delineate how experimental paradigms can be
constructed to isolate spontaneous retrieval processes.
In examining studies that attempt to examine spontaneous
retrieval, and especially those using neuroimaging techniques,
as we noted in the previous section, they often use conditions
that would appear to encourage a monitoring approach to the
PM task. For example, in an eﬀort to get as many measures of
retrieval as possible, researchers often give participants a number
of diﬀerent PM target items to learn (e.g., Kalpouzos et al., 2010).
In a study examining how sleep aﬀects spontaneous retrieval,
Diekelmann et al. (2013) gave participants 20 cue-associate pairs
to learn for their PM task. That is, when performing the ongoing
task, they were asked to press the space bar whenever they saw
any of the 20 cue words and to then type in the associated
item. Although they used focal PM targets, it is unlikely that
participants were relying on spontaneous retrieval to accomplish
the PM task (their paradigm did not allow measurement of
costs or monitoring). Instead, participants were probably actively
trying to keep the PM cues in mind and rehearsing them during
the ongoing task.
In this ﬁnal section, we present suggestions (summarized in
Table 2) for creating experimental paradigms that help isolate
spontaneous retrieval. Before doing so, however, we want to
emphasize the importance of measuring monitoring by including
a condition (varied either within- or between-subjects) that
assesses the speed and accuracy of performing the ongoing task
in the absence of a PM task. To the extent that participants rely
on spontaneous retrieval for prospective remembering, the speed
and accuracy of ongoing task performance should be similar in
the PM and control conditions.
Previous research has shown that monitoring is reduced (and
sometimes eliminated) when using a focal cue as opposed to a
non-focal cue (Einstein et al., 2005; Scullin et al., 2010a) and
when using one focal cue as opposed to multiple focal cues
(Einstein et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008). Even using a single
focal target event, however, does not ensure that participants
will rely on spontaneous retrieval (Smith et al., 2007) unless
additional conditions are implemented. In our recent research,
we have found it important to also eliminate any reference to
PM in our advertisement of the study (e.g., in the title of the
experiment). Instead, our title focuses on the ongoing task such
as our interest in measuring their accuracy and speed of making
word judgments. Along with this, during the instructions, we
emphasize the ongoing task, present the PM task as being only
of secondary interest, and remind participants occasionally of the
importance of the ongoing task (see Harrison et al., 2014, for an
example of exact instructions). To further discouragemonitoring,
we have additionally told participants that the PM target will
occur for only 5% of the participants and therefore not to worry
about it (but to press the designated key if they happen to see it).
Research has also shown that presenting fewer target events (Loft
and Yeo, 2007) and delaying the onset of the ﬁrst target event
(Loft et al., 2008) discourages monitoring.
In addition, we believe that it is important to not specify a
particular order for performing the PM response relative to the
ongoing task response. Indeed, in an attempt to discourage a
monitoring approach to the PM task, we tell participants that they
can perform the PM response at any point after seeing the target
event (i.e., before or after performing the ongoing task response
or even several trials later). By contrast, some researchers ask
participants to perform the PM response immediately and prior
to or instead of performing the ongoing task response. We believe
these latter instructions encourage monitoring and attention to
the PM task in order to avoid the error of ﬁrst performing the
ongoing task response (see Ihle et al., 2013, for evidence of larger
age eﬀects on PM tasks that specify the order of performing the
PM and ongoing tasks, presumably because these kinds of tasks
demand more monitoring and cognitive control).
As described above, one can also use a suspended intention
paradigm. Research has shown that participants do not monitor
when they are asked to suspend their intention during an
intervening task (Einstein et al., 2005; Scullin et al., 2009; Knight
et al., 2011; Rummel et al., 2012). A possible advantage of
using this type of paradigm to study spontaneous retrieval when
conducting neuroimaging research is that it may yield a purer
measure of retrieval in the sense that the observed activation is
uncontaminated by processes involved in executing the action.
In conclusion, we have argued that diﬀerent brain processes
become prominent in diﬀerent kinds of PM tasks. We believe
that a fruitful (although admittedly challenging) avenue for future
neuroimaging researchers, working within the constraints of
current neuroimaging methodological techniques, is to develop
procedures that allow the operation and measurement of the
range of processes that appear to operate in real-world PM tasks.
TABLE 2 | Suggestions for creating experimental paradigms that minimize monitoring and isolate spontaneous retrieval.
1. Use an event-based prospective memory task with as many of the following characteristics as possible.
a. Use a single focal target cue.
b. Minimize cues or demand characteristics (such as the title of the experiment) that suggest to participants that you are interested in their prospective memory.
c. Emphasize the importance of the ongoing task, minimize the importance of the prospective memory task, and remind participants of the importance of the ongoing
task from time to time.
d. Use many trials on the ongoing task and delay the onset of the first target. Also, limit the number of occurrences of the target event.
e. Do not specify the order of performing the prospective memory and ongoing task responses. That is,
f. Make it clear to participants that they can perform the prospective memory response at any point after seeing the target (including several trials later).
2. Use a suspended (or completed) intention paradigm.
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